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Ia the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH PARKS COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
IRON COUNTY, a Body Corporate and

Politic, and CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal Corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

No. 9540
and
No. 9753

Brief of Respondent Iron County
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IRON COUNTY
The Statement of Facts as given by the plaintiff-appellant is substantially correct. This is a suit brought under
Section 59-10-14, Utah Code Ann. 1953 for a refund of real
property taxes assessed by Iron County upon property at
Cedar City, Utah and known as El Escalante Hotel, for the
year 1958. On January 1, 1958 this property was owned
by the appellant but on January 31, 1958 the appellant conveyed this property to the other defendant-respondent,
Cedar City Corporation, a Municipal Corporation, which accepted the property under a covenant or condition in the
deed that it would pay any and all taxes legally assessed.
The lower court sustained the motion of the respondent
Iron County to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the complaint did not state facts upon which relief could
be granted. This respondent also joins in the Preliminary
Statement given by the appellant in its brief.
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ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE TAX ASSESSED AND PAID BY THE APPELLANT
WAS A LEGAL ASSESSMENT AND CANNOT NOW BE
RECOVERED.
The claim of the plaintiff-appellant is that although
the real property in question was O\vned by it on January
1, 1958, before the taxes for that year were subsequently
levied and assessed, the property was conveyed to the other
defendant, Cedar City Corporation, an exempt governmental body. Therefore, the lien that attached on January 1,
1958 never ripened into a valid assessment and therefore,
the taxes for that year were illegal and void. This claim
is clearly untenable and is based upon a legal fiction and
unsound reasoning.
Most states by statute provide for a time certain when
real property will bear taxes for that particular year. The
Utah Statute is Section 59-10-3, U. C. A. which provides as

follows:
"Every tax upon real property is a lien against the
property assessed; and every tax due upon improvements upon real estate assessed to other than the
owner of the real estate is a lien upon the land and
improvements; which several liens attach as of the 1st
day of January of each year."
Also, Section 59-5-4, U. C. A. 1953 provides as follo\vs:
"The county assessor must, before the 15th day of April
of each year, ascertain the na1nes of all taxable inhabitants and all property in the county subject to taxation except such as is required to be assessed by the
State Tax Con1mission and must assess such property
to the person by \vhom it was O\vned or claimed, or in
whose possession or control it \vas, at 12 o'clock m.
of the first day of January next preceding, and at its
value on that date ..... "
It is necessary that there be some date certain as to
what property and \Yhen it shall bear taxes as the county
officers must be guided by son1e specific date. The above
quoted sections setting a definite date must have had in
mind that property could and \vould be transferred during
the calendar v00r and it is subn1itted that is the n1ain reason why a definite date is fixed. Subsequent sections to
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those above quoted set forth the manner and procedure
for assessing and collecting taxes for the various county
officers. When these statutes provide that a county assessor shall assess property to the owner as of January 1 and
that the lien attaches as of this date, the statutes can only
mean what they say in clear, precise terms. But the plaintiff-appellant claims that something more should be read
into the statutes vvhich is that the Legislature meant that
the Iie·n of taxes attaches as of January 1 only if a valid
assessment and levy is thereafter made and that if the
o\vner conveys the property away before the assessment
then the owner of January 1 cannot be required to pay.
But it should make no difference whether the property is
conveyed away or not as the property must bear the taxes
and some one will have to pay. It so happens in this case
that the new owner of the property after January 31 was a
public body, Cedar City Corporation, normally exempt
from taxation and without question would have been for
all subsequent years. But the appellant's argument is sufficently broad that it would make no difference whether
the new owner was a public body or not because under its
theory, the same rule would apply as between two private
owners. The rationale of appellant's argument is that lf
the property is transferred after the lien date but before
the assessment date, the old owner cannot be required to
pay and this would seem to be appellant's argument whether the ·new owner was a public body or not. If appellant's
contention is the law, then every time there is a transfer
of property after January 1 but before the county levy is
made between the last Monday in July and the second
Monday in August, the old owner could claim that he could
not be assessed as he did not own the property when it
was assessed and the new owner could claim that since
he did not own the property on January 1 he would not
have to pay and in every case both the old and new owner
could question the validity of the tax. This would be so
whether the new owner was a public body or not. It should
be obvious to anyone that such a situation was never intended by our legislature.
If the property was in private ownership as of January 1 the mere fact that it was transferred to a public body
prior to assessment should in no way interrupt the taxing
process. All of the authorities relied upon by appellant
merely held that as to whether a valid lien attaches as of
January 1 of each year depends upon ~here subsequently
being a valid levy and assessment. Th1s respondent subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mits that this condition \vas complied with and that there
was a subsequent assessment and the fact that the property was then in publie o\vnership has nothing to do with
the case. This is particularly so when the new owner accepted the property under a condition that it assume and
pay all taxes legally assessed.
To more clearly sho\v the fallacy in the argument of
the plaintiff, suppose that in this case the property in
question had been transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant Cedar City Corporation on July 31, 1958 instead of
January 31. This would have been before the County made
its levy. The plaintiff would have had the use and occupancy of the property for seven months of the year and
would have had all the benefits of the property, including
making any profit therefrom but \vould have been able t·:}
escape the payment of any taxes for that year simply by the
process of conveying it to an exempt public body after
seven months of the year had elapsed. For the County to
get any taxes for the year it would be compelled to apportion the taxes based upon ownership, assuming it had the
power to do so.
Another vital point should be here considered. The
payment of taxes, although admittedly an onerous burden,
goes right to the foundation of all government. In fact no
government could survive without them, particularly a
County which usually has no other means of raising revenue. If property owners are permitted to dodge property
taxes by the method claimed by appellant. it strike.:; right
at the foundation of government itself and this cannot be
permitted.
Furthermore; if transferring of property during the
year v:as intended to be taken into consideration in determining who would pay taxes, there \vould be statutory
authority and m·arbinery for apportioning taxes but instead of any such statutory authority in our code, a
definiate date i~-; set, January 1, as to \Yhen the property shall bear taxes and the on
concern of the county
officers is to determine the o\vner as of tl'at date and assess accordingly.

'Y

As to \vhether a transfer of property after the lien
date bnt befo1'e the assessment date, and even to a public
body makes any difference has been ruled upon in a nnr;lher of cases anr1_ contrary to the theory of the appellant.
The case of J...~ogan vs. Luukinen, 231 Pac. 184 (Ore.) held
as follows:
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"The rule supported by the authorities is that when
the statute declares a lien from a certain date, the
lien is an encumbrance although the amount of the lien
may not yet be deter1nined or collectible. When determined, the lien dates by relation by the date fixed
by statute."
Also in Broadway-Madison Corporation vs. Fisher, 102 Pac.
2d 194, (Ore.) it was held:
"The accrual of the tax occurs on the date when there
arises a liability to pay such taxes and not when the
mechanics of computing the amount of taxes have
been completed or when the tax is due and payable."
The case of City of Santa Monica vs. Los Angeles County,
115 Pac. 945 also held that it made no difference as to a
transfer of property after the lien had attached and that
the owner on the lien date must pay the taxes. Likewise,
the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Alabama, 313 U. S. 274 which was a case in which the
u·nited States acquired land subsequent to the tax date
but prior to the date of levy. The state of Alabar.na claimed
the tax lien effective even though the land passed into
government ownership afterward and the Supreme Court
so held and the tax was held to be legal and collectible.
The Utah case of Gillmor vs. Dale, 75 Pac. 932 is relied upon strongly by the appellant to support its contentions. There certain property which had been within
the corporate limits of Sale Lake City was segregated
from the City by a segregation suit. The decree in the segregation suit was entered by the District Court in May
of the year in question, which would be after the tax date,
which was then the first Monday in February but before
the levy. The decree in the segregation suit expressly
provided that the property disconnected from the city
would bear no taxes. In other words, there is a valid court
judgment expressly exempting the property from taxes
from the date of the judgment. This could have, and, from
the court's language, did have considerable weight in holding as the court did. Furthermore, there is another vital
distinguishing feature which is that the taxes in question
were paid under protest and this will be discussed under
respondent's Point No. III.
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Point No. II.
IF THE APPELLANT HAS ANY RIGHT OF RECOVERY, IT IS ONLY AS AGAINST THE DEF't-:NDANT
CEDAR CI'TY CORPORA'riON.
The respondent Iron County contends and believes the
authorities above cited so show that the tax in question \Vas
legally levied and assessed and that some one will have to
pay the taxes for the year 1958. If not the appellant, then
it will have to be the new ovvner, Cedar City Corporation.
On this particular point, this respondent joins in the brief
of the appellant and specifically to Ppint II of the Appenlant's brief. It \vould serv~ no purpose in this brief to reiterate the argument of the appellant as to this point. This
respondent has no additional or more convincing authority than that in the brief of the appellant and will
therefore, rely upon the brief of the appellant. This
respondent feels that the cases therein cited of United
States vs. Alabama, 313 tJ. S. 274, State vs. Salt Lake County, 85 Pac. 2d 851 and State vs. Duchesne County, 85 Pac.
2d 860 definitely hold that \X/hen Cedar City Corporation
took title to the property in question, that the property
was already encumbered by 1958 taxes and vvhen it accepted title with a provision in the deed that it \Vould pay all
taxes assessed, it could only have meant these 1958 taxes.
Therefore, it is Cedar City Corporation \vhich should refund
the taxes if any are to be refunded.
Point III.
BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF lJ1AH PARKS COMPANY
CAN RECOVER THE TAXES PAID, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE TAXES \VERE PAID UI\DER PROTEST AS PRO\TIDED BY STATUTE.
It is the third contention of the defendant Iron
County that these taxes, in order to be refunded, \Vould
have had to have been paid under protest, but the plaintiff ad1nits that they \vere not. It is true that the plaintiff
undoubtedly pays a great an1ount of taxes 2nd undoubtedly
pays them up8n sub1nission of the tax notice and in son1e
instances, taxes are paid ,,·hich probably \vould not have to
be paid. Ho\vever by the same token, the plaintiff undoubtedly has a great array of accountants and auditors
Yvho handle all tax problems and it \':auld not have been
any great burfl.c"\n on the plaintiff to have discovered \\·hat
it is now claiming and paid these taxes under protest. The
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l'l~covery of taxes by the plaintiff will have to be upon one
of t.wo different statutes, one being Section 59-10-14, herein
designated as the voluntary but absolutely void tax and
the other being Section 59-11-11, U. C. A. or the payment
under protest statute. Section 59-10-14 provides as follows:

"The board of county commissioners, upon sufficient
evidence being produced that property has been erroneously or illegally assessed, may order the county
treasurer to allow the taxes on that part of the property erroneously or illegally assessed to be deducted
before payment of taxes. Any taxes, interest and costs
paid more than once, or erroneously or illegally collected, may, by order of the board of county commissioners, be refunded by the county treasurer, and the
portion of such taxes, interests and costs, paid to the
state or any taxing unit, must be refu·nded to the county, and the proper officer must draw his warrant therefor in favor of the county."
Section 59-11-11, Utah Code provides as follows:
"In all cases of levy taxes, licenses, or other demands
for public revenue which is deemed unlawful by the
party whose property is thus taxed, or from whom
such tax or license is den1anded or enforced, such
party may pay under protest such tax or license, or
any part thereof deemed unlawful, to the officers designated and authorized by la vv to collect the same;
and thereupon the party so paying or his legal representative may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the officer to whon1 said tax
or license 'vas paid, or against the state, county, municipality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the same
\vas collected, to recover said tax or license or any
portion thereof paid under protest."
These two sections have been discussed in several
cases by the Supreme Court of lTtah and in these cases,
this court makes a distinction as to the nature of the claim.
In the case of Nielsen vs. Sanpete County, 123 Pac. 334,
the taxes had been assessed against some mortagages,
for the vears 1907, 1908 and :1909. Prior to 1906 mortgages
coP1d
taxed but in that year our Constitution was
amended so as to eliminate mortgages from taxation and
therefore, on January 1, 1907 and for all the subsequent
years, such mortgages could not be taxed. Sanpete County, hO\\'Cver, had ass~ssed taxes for the years in question
~.nd they were not p.a1d under protest. The assessment and

be
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collection of these taxes were clearly void as they were in
direct contravention of our Constitution. In that case the
taxpayer presented a claim for a refund under Section 5910-14 and when it was refused, filed the action. The Court,
however, made a distinction when it said that it was obvious to anyone that the taxes were illegal from the first
instance and that section 59-10-14 could be relied upon
as a basis for a refund. This court stated, however, that
in any instance where a refund was in doubt and would
have to be ruled upon by a court, then it would be necessary that the taxes be paid under protest. It appears that
such a situation prevails in this case in view of Sections
59-5-4 and 59-10-3, U. C. A. which impose upon the county
assessor the duty of assessing and collection the taxes,
irrespective of a transfer of the property, based upon the
ownership as of January 1, particularly in view of the fact
that the new owner, Cedar City Corporation, accepted the
property under a covenant to pay the taxes. It is clear from
the Nielsen case that Section 59-10-14 only applies when the
tax assessed has always been void as this Court held, in
using the language of the Nielsen case, this statute applies in situations where "it is clear the County has ·no
authority to collect and where the County Commissioners
may readily adjust the matter" and where the "illegality
of the tax is absolutely assumed." But the case at bar is
not such a case. The law provides that the county officers
are to assess property as of the ownership on January 1
and it would we incumbent upon them to follow the law.
This is not a situation where the tax had no semblance of
legality or "warrant of law" to use Justice Wolfe~s language in the Wilson case, infra, but instead presented a legal question upon which the County Commissioners could
not rule as they would not understand the niceties of the
law. Instead it would present a situation of whether or
not the tax was lawful or unlawful, to use the language
of Section 59-11-11 and in such cases the tax would be
paid under protest so as to permit a court of competent
jurisdiction to decide the issue. It is obvious that when
Section 59-10-14 states that when "sufficient evidence" is
presented to the County Commissioners more than merely
a formal claim would have to be presented but instead
"evidence" which would indicate beyond any doubt that
the tax was illegal and void, and the County Commissioners
could summarily adjust the matter.
The Utah case of Wilson vs. Weber County, 111 Pac.
2d 147 was another case which discusses the difference in
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these t\T.ro statutes. This \Vas a case for a refund of excess
probate fees collected by the County Clerk and not paid
under protest. This Court had ruled in the case of Smith
vs. Carbon County, 63 Pac. 2d 259 that the taxes in question were illegal and void and although this decision had
not been handed down so as to guide the officers of Weber
County, the Court in the Carbon County case held that the
tax had al ,,·ays been void and therefore was in fact void
at the time of the payment of the excess fees to Weber
County. Therefore, the taxes were void from the beginning and at the time Weber County collected them. In
other words this court followed the ruling of the Nielsen
case and held that since the probate fees paid had always
been void and illegal, it \vas not necessary to have paid
them under protest. It is true that Justice \\?'olfe dissented
in the Wilson case which dissent was joined in by Justice
McDonough, but it is clear that Justice \Volfe objected to
the finding that it made no difference whether the Carbon
County case had been handed down so as to be a guide to
the vVeber County Officers and he felt that until the officers of Weber County had something to guide them, they
\Vould not know that the tax was illegal and void. Justice
\Volfe in his dissenting opinion in the Wilson case felt that
the taxes \\lOUld have had to be paid under protest before
they could be refunded. However, the majority opinion follo\ved the Nielsen case by holding that the taxes in question were al\vays illegal and void and it was not necessary
to pay them under protest ..
It should be noted that we have t\vo statutes governing the refund of taxes paid. If there are two statutes then
there must be some reason yet under the argument of the
appellant. either o1· both apply to the same situation. But
\vhen the Legislature adopted t\vo different statutes, which
adn1ittedly are a change in the common law rule, the Legislature must have intended that the t\vo statutes apply
to two different situations as pointed out in both the Nielsen and Wilson cases.
Although \Ve do not kno\v why the Utah Parks Company or its parent company, Union Pacific Railroad Con1pany, paid these taxes voluntarily and not. under protest
it is reasonably safe to assume that the officials of appellant or Union Pacific Railroad did not discover for several
r:1onths after the taxes had been paid that perhaps they
hact naid some taxes to Iron Cot~nty unnecessarily and
··ince . thev \vere not paid under protest it was necessary
f:Jr the a·ppellant to rely upon the other statute, Section
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59-10-14 as that is the only way it could get into court.
But it is the very earnest contention of this respondent that
the appellant would have had to come in under the other
statute, being Section 59-11-11, or the payment under protest statute.
The wisdom i'n the statute requiring that before a refund of taxes can be claimed, the taxes must have been
paid under protest is obvious. Both cities and counties by
law, adopt their budget in the latter end of the year when
taxes are being paid. The county for instance makes up a
tentative budget by November 1 and the final budget is
adopted by the e·nd of the year. Cities likewise adopt a
budget in December of each year. Therefore if any taxes
are claimed to be invalid or illegally assessed and are paid
under protest, the county or city would have an opporttunity to make a notation of the possibility of refund of
taxes when they adopt their budget and could provide accordingly. In this case, however, the 1958 taxes were levied and assessed and paid by the taxpayer in November
of 1958; all revenues were budgeted by the county and the
county was never put on notice until the latter end of July,
1959 when a claim was filed by the plaintiff. By this time,
all of the money had been budgeted and over one-half of
it spent and for the county to now refund $7,082.88 and
interest \vi11 be a burdensome obligation and places the
county in a precarious position not of its own making
In the case of Gillmor vs. Dale, 75 Pac. 932 (Utah), one
of the main cases relied upon by the appellant was a case
where the taxes were paid under protest and does not
support the appellant in its claim that it can recover the
taxes under Section 59-10-14.
Point IV
THE TAXES WERE VOLUNTARILY PAID, NOT
UNDER PROTEST AND CANNOT NOW BE RECOVERED.
It was the common law rule that taxes paid voluntarily could not be recovered and the following cases so hold:
Corwin Inc. Co. vs. "''hite 6 Pac. 2nd 607 (Wash.)
Pacific Finance Corp. vs. Spokane County, 15 Pac. 2nd
652 (Wash.)
Glendale Union High School District vs. Peoria School
District, 99 Pac. 2nd 482, (Ariz.)
Flynn vs. City and County of San Francisco, 115 Par.
2nd 3 (Cal.)
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Jaymes vs. Herom, 130 Pac. 2nd 29 (N. M.)
Board of Commissioners of Morgan County vs. Doherty,
168 Pac. 2nd 556 (Colo.)
Moses vs. Board of County Commissioners, 242 Pac.
2nd 743 (Kan.)
In many cases, however, this common law rule worked a hardship upon the taxpayer and many states, the
same as Utah, have adopted statutes changing the common law rule. The statutes adopted in Utah are Section
59-10-14 where taxes that were illegal, erro·neous or void
and levied without a semblance of authority or warrant of
la\v could be recovered by the simple process of submitting evidence to the County Commission of the illegality
and which would be clear to any one and other being Section 59-11-11, \vhere taxes, claimed to be unlawful, could be
paid under protest and then having the illegality adjudicated. But unless one of these statutes apply, we \vould
still have the common la \V rule. The appellant admits
that the taxes were not paid under protest so we are not
concerned with this statute and as shown above the taxes
in this case are not so illegal, erroneous or void as to con1e
\vithin the provisions of Sec. 59-10-14, and are ·not the kind
of taxes intended by this statute and therefore, the appellant cannot recover under Sec. 59-10-14. Therefore, we
are right back to the common law rule of voluntary payment and \Vhich is that the taxes cannot be recovered.
CONCLUSION
The authorities hold that the tax \vith which vve are
herein concerned was legally levied and assessed. The
tax could only be questioned as to its lawfulness or unlawfulness and to do this, it \vas necessary that the tax be
paid under protest, which it was not. Since it was not paid
under protest and was not a tax \vholly illegal and void and
without a semblance of authority, then neither of the remedial statutes regarding the refunding of taxes can be
relied upon by the appellant and therefore, this is a situation of a voluntary payment of taxes which cannot be recovered. Furthermore, if the ta~<: is legal, the appellant's
only redress is against Cedar City Corporation and not Iron
County.
Respectfully submitted,
OR\riLLE ISOM, County
Attorney, Attorney for
Iron County.
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